



**IR/HS320 - ESPIONAGE AND DIPLOMACY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**  
IES Abroad Berlin

**DESCRIPTION:**

Intelligence and espionage are often treated as intriguing yet anecdotal parts of diplomatic history. Nevertheless, a closer look at key junctures of international relations in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century exposes the central role that strategic intelligence plays in international politics. The fate of nations has often been decided based on their ability to gather, understand, and act upon information about the international systems that surround them. In addition, the world of strategic intelligence provides a distinctive setting for international interaction. From the joint efforts to decipher the enigma codes during the Second World War, through the espionage competitions of the Cold War, to the current contexts of the “war on terror” and cyber-espionage, intelligence affairs have been both a key arena for international conflict and a platform for international co-operation. This course examines the role of strategic intelligence as a distinct component in the process of foreign policy making with special focus on the role of Berlin as a battleground of strategic intelligence during the Cold War. Utilizing historical and contemporary cases, the course focuses on two distinct dimensions of strategic intelligence. Its first focus is on intelligence as a source of information shaping the national leadership’s policy choices. We will explore the manner in which intelligence information and assessments influence the strategic decision-making process of leaders and nations. Second, the course investigates the political usage of intelligence as an instrument of influence in international relations. We will investigate how nations utilize covert information and intelligence capacities as active means to promote their foreign policy goals.

**CREDITS:** 3

**CONTACT HOURS:** 45

**INSTRUCTOR:** Stefan Wolfrum and Dr. Gil Murciano;

**PREREQUISITES:** None

**METHOD OF PRESENTATION:** Lectures and class discussions

**ADDITIONAL COST:** None

**LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION:** English

**REQUIRED WORK AND FORM OF ASSESSMENT:**

- Course participation – 10%
- Mid-term exam – 40%
- Final research paper – 40%
- Presentation of final research paper – 10%

**Course Participation**

This course is based on an interactive "brainstorming" format. The development of a meaningful discussion depends on students' active participation in class and on their critical reflection on the reading materials. Each class will be structured around a separate topic, which will be addressed with the help of one or more texts posted on Moodle beforehand. Students will be expected to prepare for class by reading and reflecting upon the assigned texts and to participate in class discussions, showing that they have understood and critically evaluated the authors’ arguments. Students are expected to come prepared with personal notes on the readings. The grading rubric for participation is available in the IES Berlin Academics Manual on Moodle.

**Mid-term**

The mid-term exam will focus on the first two topics of the course – the basic concepts and methods of strategic intelligence work, and the influence of intelligence on strategic decision-making.



**Final Research Paper**

For the final paper (2,500-3,000 words), the students will be required to examine one of the theoretical aspects of strategic intelligence from the items examined in class and demonstrate its influence on a decision-making event that was not examined in class. The final paper is due after session 20.

**Final Presentation**

Each student will outline and present the main concept and results of their final paper in class (10 minutes) during the last two sessions.

**LEARNING OUTCOMES:**

By the end of the course students will be able to:

- Structurally identify and analyze the role of strategic intelligence as a key aspect of global security.
- Critically reflect on the relationship between the intelligence community and political leadership, and the strategic role that intelligence plays in shaping political leaders’ mindset and decisions in crucial junctures of decision-making.
- Assess the moral challenges and dilemmas affiliated with current intelligence gathering efforts in democratic societies.
- Outline the basic concepts of strategic intelligence work – collection, analysis and supporting the political decision-making process.
- Analyze the unique role of Berlin in the diplomatic history of international espionage in both historical and contemporary contexts.
- Analyze key cases of intelligence failures and successes to predicate/recognize/evaluate key global developments.
- Understand the concepts of intelligence cooperation and competition. While also examining intelligence agencies as a unique type of actors within the foreign policy community.
- Identify the role of covert intelligence operations as a means of political manipulation.

**ATTENDANCE POLICY**

Attendance and punctuality in all courses and field studies are mandatory. Absences can only be excused for valid reasons. Unexcused absences can affect students’ grades. Students who miss 25% or more of all class sessions will fail the course. Missed exams cannot be taken at another time except in case of documented illness. Late submission of term papers and other work will result in grade reduction unless an extension due to illness or an emergency is approved. Please consult the IES Berlin Academics Manual on Moodle for additional details.

**ACADEMIC INTEGRITY:**

Students are expected to abide by the IES Abroad Academic Integrity Code. Assigned papers need to be properly and amply footnoted where appropriate, with all sources attributed, including images. Suspicious papers may be checked with plagiarism-detecting software.

**CONTENT:**

Week	Content	Reading and Assignments
<b>Week 1</b>	<b>Session 1</b> Introduction of basic concepts and methods of strategic intelligence work 1	Herman Michael (1996). <i>Intelligence Power in Peace and War</i> . Cambridge University Press, 1992, 26, 61-81
	<b>Session 2</b> Introduction of basic concepts and methods of strategic intelligence work 2	
<b>Week 2</b>	<b>Session 3</b> Intelligence as a policy-making resource: The complex relations between the intelligence analyst and the leader-decision maker 1	George, R. Z., & Bruce, J. B. (Eds.) (2008). <i>Analyzing Intelligence</i> , 82-102
	<b>Session 4</b>	Leslau, O. (2010). The effect of intelligence on the decision-making process. International

	Intelligence as a policy-making resource: The complex relations between the Intelligence analyst and the leader-decision maker 2	<i>Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence</i> , 23(3), 426-448.
<b>Week 3</b>	<b>Session 5</b> The spy who saved peace: Analysis of capabilities vs. assessment of intentions 1	Scott, L. (1999). Espionage and the cold war: Oleg Penkovsky and the Cuban missile crisis. <i>Intelligence and National Security</i> 14(3), 23-47.
	<b>Session 6</b> The spy who saved peace: Analysis of capabilities vs. assessment of intentions 2	Mandel, R. (2009). On Estimating Post-Cold War Enemy Intentions. <i>Intelligence and National Security</i> 24(2), 194-215.
<b>Week 4</b>	<b>Session 7-8</b> Field Trip 1: The Signal Intelligence base at <i>Teufelsberg</i>  The deciphering success that saved global freedom: Balancing between sources preservation and making use of intelligence information	Murphy, D. E., Kondrashev, S. A., & Bailey, G. (1997). <i>Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War</i> . Yale University Press. 205-238.  McGrory, D. (2015). Coventry's Blitz. Amberley Publishing Limited. [Moonlight Sonata], 54-58.  Harriet Agerholm (2017). Donald Trump sharing classified intelligence with Russia 'may breach his oath of office', say national security experts. <i>The Independent</i> . 16 May 2017. <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-russia-classified-information-breach-oath-of-office-us-president-national-security-a7737866.html">http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-russia-classified-information-breach-oath-of-office-us-president-national-security-a7737866.html</a>
<b>Week 5</b>	<b>Session 9</b> Dangerous miscalculations 1: Able-Archer - Over-estimation leads to the brink of war	Scott, L. (2011). Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War: Able Archer-83 Revisited. <i>Intelligence and National Security</i> , 26(6), 759- 777
	<b>Session 10</b> Dangerous miscalculations 2: The Iraq Invasion - Over-estimation leads to war	Jervis Robert (2010). <i>Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War</i> . Cornell University Press. 123- 156.  Media: Segments from <i>Deutschland 83</i>
<b>Week 6</b>	<b>Midterms</b>	Writtten Exam
<b>Week 7</b>	<b>Session 11</b> Dangerous miscalculations 3: Under-estimation leads to a fundamental surprise [Practical exercise: Operation Babylon]	Kahana, E. (2002). Early warning versus concept: the case of the Yom Kippur War 1973. <i>Intelligence and National Security</i> 17(2), 81-104.
	<b>Session 12</b> Dangerous miscalculations 4: Under-estimation leads to a fundamental surprise	Jervis Robert (2010). <i>Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War</i> . Cornell University Press. 15-34, 109-123.
<b>Week 8</b>	<b>Session 13</b> Intelligence Cooperation as a professional method	Clough, C. (2004). Quid pro quo: The challenges of international strategic intelligence cooperation. <i>International journal of intelligence and counterintelligence</i> 17(4), 601-613.
	<b>Session 14</b> Intelligence Cooperation as a diplomatic practice	

		Shapiro, S. (2002). Intelligence services and foreign policy: German- Israeli intelligence and military co-operation. <i>German Politics</i> 11(1), 23-42.
<b>Week 9</b>	<b>Session 15-16</b> Field Trip 2: StaSi Museum Espionage at the crossroads between civil liberties and national security in the age of transnational security threats	Farrall, K. (2011). Suspicious activity reporting: US domestic intelligence in a postprivacy age?. In <i>Government Secrecy</i> . Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 247-276. Lodge, J. (2004). EU homeland security: citizens or suspects?. <i>Journal of European Integration</i> 26(3), 253-279.
<b>Week 10</b>	<b>Session 17</b> D&D: Deception and Denial 1 [Practical exercise: Operation Maskirovka]	Crowdy, T. (2011). <i>Deceiving Hitler: Double-Cross and Deception in World War II</i> . Bloomsbury Publishing. 220-246.
	<b>Session 18</b> D&D: Deception and Denial 2	Greenberg, A (2017). Russian Hackers Are Using 'Tainted' Leaks to Sow Disinformation. <i>Wired</i> . 25 May 2017. <a href="https://www.wired.com/2017/05/russian-hackers-using-tainted-leaks-sow-disinformation/">https://www.wired.com/2017/05/russian-hackers-using-tainted-leaks-sow-disinformation/</a>  Bruce, J. B., & Bennett, M. (2008). Foreign denial and deception: Analytical imperatives. <i>Analyzing intelligence: Origins, obstacles, and innovations</i> , 122-137.
<b>Week 11</b>	<b>Session 19-20</b> Field trip 3: KGB secret prison in Potsdam	Final paper due after session 20.
	<b>Session 21-22</b> The Cyber Revolution  Final Presentations	Rudner, M. (2013). Cyber-threats to critical national infrastructure: An intelligence challenge. <i>International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence</i> 26(3), 453-481.
<b>Week 13</b>	<b>Finals</b>	Final Research Paper due (Thursday 6:00 PM)

#### COURSE-RELATED TRIPS:

- The Signal Intelligence base at *Teufelsberg*
- The StaSi Museum on the former grounds of the headquarters of the GDR Ministry for State Security (MfS)
- The KGB secret prison in Potsdam

#### REQUIRED READINGS:

- Bruce, J. B., & Bennett, M. (2008). Foreign denial and deception: Analytical imperatives. *Analyzing intelligence: Origins, obstacles, and innovations*, 122-137.
- Clough, C. (2004). Quid pro quo: The challenges of international strategic intelligence cooperation. *International journal of intelligence and counterintelligence* 17(4), 601-613.
- Crowdy, T. (2011). *Deceiving Hitler: Double-Cross and Deception in World War II*. Bloomsbury Publishing. 220-246.
- Farrall, K. (2011). Suspicious activity reporting: US domestic intelligence in a postprivacy age?. In *Government Secrecy*. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 247-276.
- George, R. Z., & Bruce, J. B. (Eds.) (2008). *Analyzing Intelligence*, 82-102
- Greenberg, A (2017). [Russian Hackers Are Using 'Tainted' Leaks to Sow Disinformation](https://www.wired.com/2017/05/russian-hackers-using-tainted-leaks-sow-disinformation/). *Wired*. 25 May 2017.

<https://www.wired.com/2017/05/russian-hackers-using-tainted-leaks-sow-disinformation/>

- Harriet Agerholm (2017). Donald Trump sharing classified intelligence with Russia 'may breach his oath of office', say national security experts. *The Independent*. 16 May 2017. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-russia-classified-information-breach-oath-of-office-us-president-national-security-a7737866.html>
- Herman, Michael (1996). *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*. Cambridge University Press, 1996). pp 10-26, 61-81
- Jervis Robert (2010). *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War*. Cornell University Press. 123- 156.
- Jervis Robert (2010). *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War*. Cornell University Press. 15-34, 109-123.
- Kahana, E. (2002). Early warning versus concept: the case of the Yom Kippur War 1973. *Intelligence and National Security* 17(2), 81-104.
- Leslau, O. (2010). The effect of intelligence on the decision making process. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 23(3), 426-448.
- Lodge, J. (2004). EU homeland security: citizens or suspects?. *Journal of European Integration* 26(3), 253-279.
- Mandel, R. (2009). On Estimating Post-Cold War Enemy Intentions. *Intelligence and National Security* 24(2), 194-215.
- McGrory, D. (2015). Coventry's Blitz. Amberley Publishing Limited. [Moonlight Sonata], 54-58.
- Murphy, D. E., Kondrashev, S. A., & Bailey, G. (1997). *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War*. Yale University Press. 205-238.
- Rudner, M. (2013). Cyber-threats to critical national infrastructure: An intelligence challenge. *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence* 26(3), 453-481.
- Scott, L. (1999). Espionage and the cold war: Oleg Penkovsky and the Cuban missile crisis. *Intelligence and National Security* 14(3), 23-47.
- Scott, L. (2011). Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War: Able Archer-83 Revisited. *Intelligence and National Security*, 26(6), 759- 777.
- Shapiro, S. (2002). Intelligence services and foreign policy: German- Israeli intelligence and military co-operation. *German Politics* 11(1), 23-42.

**RECOMMENDED READINGS:**

Additional recommended readings will be posted on Moodle